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ABSTRACT
 
Most current models in health psychology assume
 
that self-esteem (SE) mediates stress and stress ad
 
versely affects physical health. This study examined
 
the direct effect of SE on blood pressure (BP), choles
 
terol, thyroxine and leukocyte levels. Medical records
 
were used for evaluation. In a pilot study, a SE
 
measure was developed using selected items from the
 
Beck Depression Inventory, Taylor Manifest Anxiety
 
Scale and SCL-R-90 along with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
 
Scale. The final set of SE items were chosen by item
 
analysis and used to analyze the physiological data.
 
Defensiveness (DEF) from the Marlowe-Crowne Social
 
Desirability Scale controlled the self-reported data.
 
SE was only significant in the interaction between SE
 
and DEF on diastolic BP. Neither SE or DEF had signif
 
icant effects on either systolic BP, cholesterol, or
 
leukocyte levels. Results demonstrate the effects of
 
DEF and NA in self-reports is unrelated to actual
 
findings, in contrast to self-reported health indices.
 
The lack of findings may reflect the measure of SE used
 
in the present study.
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INTRODUCTION
 
In recent years there has been resurgent interest
 
in self-esteem. In 1986, California passed AB-3659,
 
Chapter 1065 which created the State Task Force on
 
Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility.
 
This law mandated that each County form a Self-Esteem
 
Task Force to identify existing successful programs (or
 
develop new ones) that promote positive self-esteem in
 
all areas of the population. Since then several other
 
states and two countries have followed California's
 
lead to develop programs to promote high self-esteem in
 
their communities.
 
Is self-esteem related to physical health? Rela
 
tionships have been found between various other person
 
ality constellations and physical health, such as Type
 
A personality type (Rosenman, 1978), the repressive
 
coping style (Weinberger, 1990), depression (Rice,
 
1987), anxiety (Silthanen, 1984), negative affect
 
(Campbell & Fehr, 1990), and dispositional optimism
 
(Schier, Matthews, Owens, Magovern, Lefebre, Abbott &
 
Carver, 1989). These personality measures are likely
 
to be strong correlates of self-esteem; however, the
 
relationships of global self-esteem to physical health
 
measures such as blood pressure, cholesterol, thyroxine
 
or leuckocyte levels have not been directly investigat
 
ed.
 
The relationship between self-esteem and psycho
 
logical health has been well dociimented {e.g., Cramer,
 
1985; Miller, Kreitman, Ingham & Sashidharan, 1989).
 
For example. Miller, et al., (1989) investigated types
 
of life events associated with low self-esteem, the
 
role of life events and self-esteem in onset of psychi
 
atric disorders, and the significance of prior psychi
 
atric disorders in determining onset of current psychi
 
atric disorders in 340 women. The onset of major
 
depression was best predicted by an interaction between
 
high total stress and low self-esteem. Cramer (1985)
 
found in two studies that subjects who had high self-

esteem suffered less from various psychological symp
 
toms.
 
One area in" which the relationship between self-

esteem and physical health has been addressed indirect
 
ly is through its mediation of the stress effects on
 
physical health (Brown, 1988; Greenberg, 1990). Brown
 
(1988), for one, demonstrated that self-concept mediat
 
ed the effects of stressful events on physical health.
 
Persons with "uncertain" self-concepts were more vul
 
nerable to stress-induced deteriorations in health than
 
those with a strong sense of identity. Greenberg
 
(1990) states that the "every essence of stress manage
 
ment requires confidence in yourself and in your deci
 
sions to control your life effectively" (p. 135).
 
Another area that is related to the possible
 
relationship between self-esteem and physical health is
 
a large body of research studying major life events and
 
physical health. In general, this research shows that
 
major life events adversely affect physical health.
 
These results have been found in different populations
 
with a variety of methodologies (for reviews, see
 
Jemmott & Locke, 1984; Maes, Vingerhoets, & Van Heck,
 
1987). Negative life events have been shown to have
 
adverse effects on physical health, and the self-con
 
cept is a mediator for those effects (Brown, 1988).
 
Positive life events have been shown to increase ill
 
ness in subjects with low self-esteem who may fear
 
success may be shortlived or not controllable, whereas
 
positive life events have been linked to better health
 
among subjects with high self-esteem (Brown & McGill,
 
1989).
 
Central to mediating the stress incurred from life
 
events are perceptions of control over them. A good
 
deal of research indicates that perceptions of control
 
also promote physical well-being, especially during
 
stressful times, such as negative life events (for
 
reviews, see Rodin, 1986; Taylor, 1986). Not only are
 
controllable events seen as less stressful than uncon
 
trollable ones (Brown & Siegel, 1988), but also many of
 
the cognitive, affective, and motivational deficits
 
that accompany exposure to aversive events are reduced
 
in magnitude when individuals believe they have a
 
controlling response (Seligman, 1975). Physiological
 
reactivity also appears to be reduced when individuals
 
believe that stressful events can be controlled (Frank­
enhaeuser, 1981). Persons of high self-esteem may have
 
increased feelings of control over themselves and their
 
environment, hence, have lower physiological reactivi
 
ty.
 
As an example of perceptions of control mediating
 
the stress of a life event, Schier, et al. (1989)
 
investigated the perceptions of dispositional optimism
 
in which control is theorized as playing an important
 
role in 51 men who experienced coronary artery bypass
 
surgery. They found that dispositional optimism was
 
associated with faster rates of recovery and return to
 
normal life activities, but also with the quality of
 
postsurgical life.
 
Thus, it appears that self-esteem mediates the
 
effects of stress and life events, and there is abun
 
dant literature that documents the effects of stress on
 
physical health (for review, see Rice, 1987). Whether
 
the effects of self-esteem on physical health may be
 
more direct is not known. The purpose of this study
 
was not to study the effects of stress or perceived
 
control, but rather to investigate directly the rela
 
tionship between self-esteem and selected physiological
 
measures.
 
The Self-Concept
 
According to Rosenberg & Kaplan (1982), the self-

concept is "the totality of the individual's thoughts
 
and feelings with reference to himself or herself as an
 
object" (p. xiii). It is not only what an individual
 
thinks of her/himself, but also how she/he thinks
 
others evaluate him/her.
 
Various theorists have classified the self-concept
 
into broad areas. One of the most familiar distinc
 
tions is between the conscious and unconscious concepts
 
(through dreams and associations, one may learn one's
 
underlying thoughts and feelings about oneself). A
 
second distinction is between the inner and outer world
 
of thoughts and feelings or in terms of social exterior
 
or overt public qualities, that is, self-monitoring or
 
self-focusing (Rosenberg & Kaplan, 1982).
 
Another aspect of the self-concept is whether it
 
is encased in a single-body or extends beyond it. In
 
other words, what are the boundaries of the self and how
 
far does it extend? Cooley (1902) used the term "to
 
appropriate" to express the process by which an indi
 
vidual takes objects into the self. The self is said
 
to expand and contract with experience. New external
 
elements are incorporated into the self, some even
 
becoming central while others are devalued and exclud
 
ed. The term commonly assigned to this phenomena is
 
ego-extensions. William James (1890) describes: "Our
 
fame, our children, the work of our hands may be as
 
dear to us as our bodies are and arouse the same feel
 
ing as the same acts of reprisal if attacked" (p.
 
291).
 
The elemental components of the self that expand
 
and contract through experience and incur constant
 
assessment in terms of cognitive concepts were deline
 
ated by Markus (1977): "Self-schemata are cognitive
 
generalizations about the self, derived from past
 
experience, that organize and guide the processing of
 
self-related information contained in the individual's
 
social experiences" (p. 64). The self-schemata is the
 
self-concept because it is one's frame of reference.
 
It serves as an anchor for adjusting to one's current
 
daily experience. Individuals pay attention to certain
 
things and not others; interpret facts one way rather
 
than another; accept or reject information about them
 
selves; and generally respond to the concrete experi
 
ences of life in terms of their pre-established ideas
 
of what they are like. Such self-schemata in Markus'
 
terms "organize, stimmarize and explain behavior" and it
 
makes no difference if the component is positive,
 
negative or neutral. Self-schemata within an attribu
 
tion theory framework can be viewed as "implicit theo
 
ries used by individuals to make sense of their own
 
past behavior and to direct the course of future behav
 
ior" (p. 78).
 
A number of theorists (Epstein, 1973; Lecky, 1945;
 
Swann, 1987) agree that the self-concept acts largely
 
to organize and guide personal experience. It develops
 
as a conceptual tool that individuals use to understand
 
their own behavior and the behavior of others toward
 
them. Carl Rogers (1959) agrees with these writers
 
that the structure of the self is shaped through inter
 
action with the environment, particularly the environ
 
ment composed of parents and significant others; and
 
although it is fluid, it retains a patterned, gestalt-

like quality to it.
 
In more specific terms, self-conceptions (a) aid
 
in processing personal information (Markus, 1977), (b)
 
provide individuals a basis for present (Gergen, 1971)
 
and future behavior (Markus & Nurius, 1986); and (c)
 
influence the course of social interaction insofar that
 
individuals react to one another on the basis of iden
 
tities they project (Swann, 1987). Collectively, these
 
functions allow individuals to deal more efficiently
 
with, and better predict and control, their social
 
world (Brown & McGill, 1989), or from a functional
 
framework, well-adjusted individuals might be defined
 
as efficacious social problem-solvers who experience
 
little dysphoric affect or self-control problems
 
(ROsenbaum, 1980).
 
Self-Esteem
 
The judgment aspect of the self-concept is self-

esteem. Although self-esteem can be considered to have
 
various components (Rosenberg & Kaplan, 1982), it is
 
also acknowledged as a global measure of ah individu
 
al's self-evaluation (Rosenberg, 1965). That is, when
 
individuals consider their intelligence (self-

schemata), the judgment of positive, negative or neu
 
tral forms the self-esteem about their intelligence.
 
This judgment then contributes to or affects global
 
self-esteem in terms of its relative importance to the
 
self-concept (Kaplan, 1975). Further, the judgment
 
involves not only what individuals feel about themself,
 
but also how they feel others view them (Bandura, 1977).
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Kaplan (1975) states that the desire for self-

esteem is universal and characterizes a dominant mo
 
tive. In all past and contemporary cultures, self-

esteem characteristically develops as a result of
 
processes set in motion by the child's initial depend
 
ence upon others for satisfactions of basic physical
 
needs present at birth. However, this is not to say
 
that the development of self-esteem in inevitable.
 
According to Kaplan, if the adults in the child's
 
experience are invariable (uniformly positive/negative
 
regardless of the child's behavior) or inconsistent
 
(child's behavior evokes positive responses or some
 
times negative responses), the child might not learn to
 
associate particular behaviors on her/his part with
 
particular adult attitudes toward her/him and thus
 
might not develop the need for positive attitudinal
 
responses from others or the need for positive self-

attitudes (the need for other's approval).v
 
According to Rogers (1959), the development of
 
high self-esteem assures the tendency toward becoming
 
an independent, self-actualized person with a compati
 
ble self-concept. This high self-esteem individual is
 
unlikely to behave in ways which are inconsistent with
 
the self-concept because this would frustrate the need
 
for positive self-esteem. This was confirmed by Rosen­
berg's (1965) findings that adolescents with positive
 
self-esteem had a more stable self-concept over time
 
that those with negative self-esteem. Also, Campbell
 
and Fehr (1988) found that the behavior of high self-

esteem subjects via self-reports were consistent and
 
congruent with partner and observer ratings, whereas
 
the behavior of low self-esteem subjects was neither
 
consistent or congruent with partner or observer rat
 
ings.
 
Mechanisms Relating Self-^Esteem to Health
 
Although global self-esteem has never been direct
 
ly related to health, disruptions to the self-concept
 
and its effects on self-esteem are known to affect
 
physical health and illness (Brown & Siegel, 1988;
 
Frankenhaeuser, 1981; Seligman, 1975). Although these
 
mechanisms were not examined in the present study, the
 
above cited research indicates that perceptions of
 
control during stressful or aversive life events medi
 
ate stress and its effects on physical health. This
 
implies that a well-adjusted individual feels an abili
 
ty to predict and control life events, especially
 
stressful or aversive ones, and that this ability
 
assists in the development of a strong, stable self-

concept with high self-esteem. But, what happens to
 
self-esteem and physical health when life events are
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perceived as beyond one's control? What are the condi
 
tions of disruption of the self-concept and how does
 
the disruptions affect self-esteem and physical health?
 
Carl Rogers (1959) states that when incoming
 
experiences are recognized as incongruent with the
 
self-concept, the experience becomes a threat to the
 
individual's self-concept and self-esteem due to the
 
conflict between his/her self-related perceptions and
 
actual experience. As a result, the individual becomes
 
potentially vulnerable to anxiety and personality
 
disorganization if the current self-structure is not
 
maintained.
 
"This goal is achieved by the perceptual
 
distortion of the experience in awareness,
 
in such a way as to reduce the incongruity
 
between the experience and the structure
 
of the self, or by the denial of any
 
experience, thus denying any threat to
 
the self" (Rogers, 1959, p. 204-205).
 
Changes to the self-concept have been examined by
 
several authors (Engle, 1959; Kaplan, 1975). Kaplan
 
(1975) describes both a positive self-concept (consist
 
ing mostly positive self-evaluations) and a negative
 
self-concept (consisting of mostly negative self-evalu­
tions). Further, individuals appear to change their
 
self-attitudes over time in a positive direction rather
 
than in a negative direction. But, when most subjects'
 
are faced with experiences that could incur self-deval­
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uating responses, a charaGteristic calGulated response
 
is to increase positive (and defend against negative)
 
self-evaluation which increases positive (and decreases
 
negative) self-attitudes. This may occur through
 
readjustment of response patterns to more closely
 
approximate positively valued goals, misperceptions of
 
attitudes, behaviors, or circiimstances, or a reordering
 
of values. However, Engle (1959) reported some stabil
 
ity of self-concept over a two-year period in high
 
school students noting that the most change in posi
 
tive/negative self-concept occurred in the negative
 
self-concept grouping.
 
However, readjusted self-evaluations are not the
 
only defensive mechanism or coping style used to pre
 
vent disruptions of an established self-concept. An
 
alternative method is to repress disruptions to the
 
self concept. For example, Weinberger (1990) describes
 
repressive individuals as "viewing themselves as the
 
kind of persons who do not experience much subjective
 
distress seems central to their self-concept" (p. 53).
 
Haan (1985) states the critical transformation from
 
suppression to repression occurs when "I prefer not to
 
think about it" changes to "There is nothing to think
 
about." Repressive coping individuals have been found
 
in a majority of psychophysiological studies to be more
 
12
 
reactive than consciously distressed subjects (Hare,
 
1966; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Parsons, Fulgenzi, &
 
Edelberg, 1969; Scarpetti, 1973), more reactive in
 
cardiovascular, muscular, electrodermal, and cortical
 
responses to laboratory stress (Schwartz, 1986), and
 
hence, more at risk for physical illneSses such as
 
asthma, hypertension and cancer than nOn-repressive
 
individuals (Schwartz, 1986)• Thus, repressive coping
 
may be a mechanism to maintain high self-esteem that
 
interferes with physiological functioning.
 
Another theory addressing self-devaluing self-

perceptions that disrupt the self-concept is Higgins'
 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory in which individuals
 
distinguish between the "ideal/own self" and
 
"ideal/other self" and between "ought/own self" and
 
"ought/other self". Discrepancies between the
 
actual/own self and ideal/(own or other) selves lead to
 
dejection-related emotions, such as sadness, disap
 
pointment, frustration and shame. Higgins suggests
 
that the person believes s/he have been unable to
 
attain hopes, dreams or aspirations that either the
 
person has set for him/herself or a significant person
 
has set for them. When the discrepancy between actual
 
and ought self is revealed, the individual experiences
 
agitation-related emotions, such as fear, anxiety or
 
13
 
guilt. In these cases according to Higgins, the person
 
believes that s/he has failed to live up to standards
 
set for good, dutiful or responsible behavior set by
 
oneself or others. These agitated emotions stem from
 
the experience of feeling that one is being punished
 
(by self or others) for not doing what one ought to do.
 
Higgins (1987) administered a list of traits or
 
attributes, such as "honest," "hdt-tempered," "friend
 
ly," easy-going," "sincere," etc. to university under
 
graduates and then one month later also administered
 
assessments of depression and anxiety. As predicted,
 
actual/ideal discrepancies predicted depression, but
 
not anxiety; whereas, actual/ought discrepancies pre
 
dicted anxiety, but not depression. Students who felt
 
they were not living to their ideal selves reported
 
high levels of sadness and depression, whereas those
 
who felt they were not living up to their ought selves
 
reported high level of fear and anxiety.
 
Unfortunately, self-denigration, disruptions to
 
the self-concept, negative affect, and stress-related
 
physical illnesses seem to have many sources. Ogilvie
 
(1987) examined still a different kind of disturbance to
 
the self-concept. Whereas Higgins (1987) focused on
 
the extent to which the perceived actual self differs
 
from other positive selves (ideal or ought), Ogilvie
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(1987) examined the extent to which the actual self is
 
similar to an undesired self. The undesired self
 
contains attributes that the person fears, dreads,
 
hates and actively seeks to exclude from one's experi
 
ence. Ogilvie suggests that we may be in closer touch
 
with our undesired selves because they are rooted in
 
our past experiences, than our ideal/ought selves which
 
are more hypothetieal. Ogilvie obtained university
 
undergraduate students' characterizations of their
 
actual, ideal and undesired selves and "measured" the
 
distance between these positions in a hypothetical
 
space. The results indicated that the distance between
 
a person's ideal and actual selves was negatively
 
associated with life satisfaction, while the distance
 
between the undesired and actual selves was positively
 
associated with life satisfaction. The second effect
 
was larger. This is to say that the distance between
 
undesired and actual selves was a much stronger predic
 
tor of life satisfaction than was the distance between
 
ideal and actual selves. Ogilvie's findings imply that
 
if we want to be happy, we will do better avoiding self-

denigration rather than striving to be the way we want
 
to be.
 
The physical consequences of this thinking pattern
 
was shown in an important study by Pearlin and Schooler
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(1978). They interviewed 2,300 people from urban
 
Chicago and found that three psychological traits
 
(self-esteem, self-denigration and mastery) were cru
 
cial in protecting against the effects of psychological
 
stress. Of these, the most significant was self-deni
 
gration. The more frequent the individual had negative
 
thoughts about self, the greater the stress. Most
 
significant was the fact that self-denigration was the
 
strongest variable for all four of the major life
 
events assessed in the study (i.e., marital stress,
 
parenting stress, family financial stress, and work
 
stress).
 
Thus, individuals who experience aversive events
 
strive to maintain a positive self-concept and defend
 
against negative self-perceptions that would disrupt
 
their self-concept and lower their self-esteem. This
 
may cause them to experience the additional stress of
 
inability to predict and control the environment incur
 
ring degrees of self-rejection and failure to maintain
 
their self-worth. These self-devaluing responses can
 
facilitate depression and/or anxiety which would have
 
implications for physical health.
 
Identity Disruption as a Model
 
Thus far, several theorists (Higgins, 1987; Kap
 
lan, 1975; Ogilvie, 1987) have attempted to describe
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V 
some of the conditions and responses inherent in chang
 
ing the self-concept. In essence, when an individual
 
encounters relatively common or major life events, the
 
way a person thinks about the self may change. The
 
impact of the degree of disturbance in the self-concept
 
is predicted by the identity disruption model of stress
 
(Brown, 1987), which holds that the more a life event
 
changes one's self-cbhcept, the greater the person's
 
risk for developing illness. A two-step process is
 
proposed: a) life events create alterations in identity
 
and (b) identity disruption has a negative impact on
 
health. So far, there are four ways that life events
 
initiate disturbances in the self-concept. First, they
 
may cause individuals to abandon an existing identity.
 
When people graduate from college, they shed the stu
 
dent identity. Life events may also require individu
 
als to adopt new identities. When individuals marry,
 
they take on the identity of husband or wife. Life
 
events may also disrupt identity by changing the struc
 
ture of the self-concept. When one leaves home for the
 
first time, the identity of a son or daughter may de
 
cline in importance as new identities rise in promi
 
nence. Or, life events may cause an individual to re­
evaluate pre-existing identities. After losing one's
 
job, for example, the identity of being successful in
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one's career may be called into question (Brovm &
 
McGill, 1989).
 
The functions of self-conceptions suggest two
 
alternatives by which identity disruption may impair
 
health. First, because self-conceptions facilitate
 
personal information processing and provide clear
 
guidelines for present and future behaviors, individu
 
als experiencihg identity disruption must devote extra
 
attention to those tasks, thus reducing the amount of
 
energy available for other tasks (Brown & McGill,
 
1989). This general depletion of resources could then
 
limit a person's ability to withstand illness (Selye,
 
1956).
 
Secondly, identity disruption may also negatively
 
affect physical health by undermining one's sense of
 
control over the environment, weakening the^identity's
 
usefulness as a conceptual tool because of the per
 
ceived inability to predict and control events. Thus,
 
a diminution in perceived control may represent another
 
way identity disruption impairs physical health (Brown
 
& McGill, 1989).
 
In summary, the identity disruption model of
 
stress (Brown, 1987) states the more a life event
 
changes the way a person thinks about the self, the
 
greater the person's risk for developing illness.
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Identity disruption may negatively affect physical
 
health by undermining one's sense of control over the
 
environment. This loss of control may have negative
 
consequences for physical health. Thus, the relation
 
ship between self-esteem and physical health can be
 
mediated by identity and control issues.
 
Negative Affect; The Outcome of Disturbance to the
 
Self-Concept
 
Another observation by Kaplan (1975) is the asso
 
ciation between self-devaluing experiences and subjec
 
tive distress/negative affect (i.e., sadness, anger,
 
bitterness, tenseness, panic, hopelessness, pressure,
 
etc.) when, by definition, individuals display negative
 
affect (NA) in response to negative self-perceptions
 
and self-evaluations. The self-esteem motive is in
 
ferred by relating the affective responses to self-

devaluing experiences, such as characteristic responses
 
of negative affect to self-devaluing experiences and
 
positive affect to positive self-evaluation experi
 
ences.
 
Watson and Clark (1984) have shown that a number
 
of diverse personality scales (e.g., trait anxiety, ego
 
strength, and neuroticism) are measures of the common
 
stable trait of negative affect. They stated that
 
negative affect is the disposition to experience aver­
19
 
sive emotional states, and defined high-NA individuals
 
as those who are "distressed and upset" (p. 465).
 
Although common measures of depression (e.g.. Beck
 
Depression Inventory; Beck, 1967) and less severe, more
 
transient negative mood states correlate substantially
 
with negative affect (Watson and Clark, 1984), self
 
esteem is a concomitant of negative affect when it NA
 
has been shown to be relatively stable over long period
 
of time (Conley, 1984; Costa & McCrae, 1980; Wells &
 
Stryker, 1988).
 
But what is the relationship between low or high
 
NA and self-esteem or the self-concept? Is there any
 
response difference between low or high NA individuals
 
when they encounter life events? Research has found a
 
consistent relationship between subjective distress
 
(negative affect) and low self-esteem implying congru
 
ence of the self-esteem motive (Rosenberg, 1965).
 
Watson and Clark's (1984) found that low NA individuals
 
are generally better adjusted than high NA individuals,
 
and they agree with Taylor and Brown's (1988) theory
 
that the optimistic beliefs of low NA individuals, even
 
when they are unrealistic, are healthy and adaptive.
 
This association becomes important when potentially
 
threatening life events are encountered, as self-con
 
cept uncertainty and negativity are critical to the
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disposition to experience aversive emotional states
 
such as depression or anxiety (Campbell & Fehr, 1990).
 
As noted earlier, NA is assessed by many common person
 
ality measures, is a measure of maladjustment, low
 
self-esteem, pessimism and ego-strength (reverse-keyed)
 
and generally is a diffuse, nonspecific measure of
 
subjective distress and dissatisfaction that exerts a
 
pervasive influence in self-report personality assess
 
ment (Watson & Clark, 1984).
 
Thus, negative affect can influence an individu
 
al's self-concept, contribute to low self-esteem, and
 
affect physical health due to the effects of stress.
 
Research has shown that LSE individuals are more likely
 
to experience negative affect, cognitive and behavioral
 
reactions to failure or negative feedback than HSE
 
individuals (Brockner, Derr & Laing, 1987; Campbell and
 
Fairey, 1985; Moreland and Sweeney, 1984). Brockner
 
(1983) reviewed a substantial body of research indicat
 
ing LSE subjects are generally more susceptible to the
 
effects of self-relevant cues. Kernis, Brockner and
 
Frankel (1989) found that in response to negative
 
feedback, LSE individuals had a greater tendency to
 
overgeneralize the implications of the negative feed­
back to other aspects of their identities than HSE
 
individuals. Even repressive copers who by definition
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have rigid control over affect and impulses experience
 
poor self-regulation of emotions once the defensive
 
structure is breached. Megargee, Cook and Mendelsohn
 
(1967) found in a series of studies that the majority
 
of individual imprisoned for sudden, extremely violent
 
acts of aggression are repressive rather than undercon­
trolled. Blackburn (1965) found in another study that
 
psychiatric patients who were repressive were more
 
likely referred for treatment because of temper out
 
bursts or somatic symptoms, such as paralysis or back
 
pain. Therefore, in response to failure or negative
 
feedback, negative affect may contribute to one's low
 
self-esteem, negative self-concept, and have adverse
 
effects on physical and mental health as a result of
 
the stress created by life events.
 
The relationships between NA, health complaints
 
and actual health are not so simple. Watson and Penne­
baker (1989) call into question the use of health
 
scales and other types of physical status measures
 
because these questionnaires rely on subjective self-

reports. The questionnaires ask subjects to assess how
 
frequently or intensely they have experienced various
 
physical symptoms or problems, such as headaches, back
 
pain, etc. Although Watson and Pennebaker agree that
 
these self-reports have been extensively validated
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against hard evidenee of dysfunction (e.g., data from
 
medical records), they suggest that self-report health
 
scales have two distinct components: one is subjective
 
and psychological, and the other that is objective and
 
more clearly health related. In their study, Watson
 
and Pennebaker tested university employees, students,
 
and adults from a rural community not affiliated with
 
the university. They found that the association be
 
tween NA and health complaints is quite general and
 
that NA is related to a broad range of self-reported
 
physical problems.
 
Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found little support
 
for the NA-actual health complaint relationship. They
 
found that NA individuals complain about their health,
 
but showed no hard evidence for poorer health or in
 
creased mortality.
 
Further, Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found that
 
NA was not consistently associated with major or chron
 
ic health problems, at least not in the populations
 
they studied. However, the correlation between NA and
 
reported somatic problems remained strong in these
 
samples. So major health problems were not a signifi
 
cant cause of high NA in normal subject and such prob
 
lems could not offer an acceptable explanation for the
 
NA-health complaint correlations found in their sample.
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Watson and Pennebaker's findings also agreed with
 
McCrae, Bartone and Gosta (1976) and Tessler and Me
 
chanic (1978) who found that NA correlated significant
 
ly with self-rated health, self-rated health has sig
 
nificantly associated with physicians' ratings, but NA
 
was unrelated to physicians' ratings. They noted that
 
the relation between NA scores and somatic complaining
 
was strongly linear and continuous. Despite their
 
iryriad of complaints, high NA individuals showed no
 
increased frequency of physician or health center
 
visits. In order to explain these results, Watson and
 
Fennebaker present recent theory and research that high
 
NA subjects are hypervigilant and scan the world for
 
impending trouble (Tellegen, 1985). The hypervigilance
 
of NA subjects may help explain their increased somatic
 
complaining in two ways. First, high NAs may be more
 
apt to notice or attend to normal body sensations and
 
minor aches and pains. Secondly, because their per
 
sistent scanning is anxiety-based, high NAS may inter
 
pret normal symptoms as painful or pathological.
 
Several studies have indicated that high NA subjects
 
interpret airbiguous stimuli in a negative or threaten
 
ing manner (Goodstein, 1954; Haney, 1973; and Watson &
 
Clark, 1984).
 
The review of extensive evidence demonstrating
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that NA is associated with a broad range of subjective
 
complaints and that NA highly correlates with self-

reports of physical symptoms suggests an expansion of
 
the conception of NA. Rather than just a disposition
 
of negative emotion, NA is more a general trait of
 
somatopsychic distress (Watson and Pennebaker, 1989)
 
which is self-reported distress that represents a
 
single pervasive trait that is expressed through a
 
broad range of negative affect states and somatic
 
complaints.
 
Thus,, it is possible that self-esteem may be
 
related to measures of somatic complaints, but whether
 
it is related to actual and objective measures of
 
physical health is unknown. Therefore, individuals'
 
self-deceptive traits must be considered in any self-

reported measure used in order to obtain a reliable
 
uncontaminated estimate of any personality measure
 
including self-esteem.
 
The Role of Defensiveness in the Self-Concept
 
Dimensions discussed by Turner (1976) regarding
 
authentic or inauthentic regions of the self are impor
 
tant to this discussion. Certain aspects of ourselves
 
do not reflect what we feel we really are. Some parts
 
of the self are experiences of "the real self" or "true
 
me," whereas others are viewed as more "superficial,"
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"artificial," or "alien". The behavior we exhibit in a
 
social setting may not be a true representation of what
 
we really feel about ourselves. We build up concepts
 
of what we are like and experience qualities or actions
 
contrary to these as "inauthentic" or "unreal".
 
Turner (1976) presents a question of which parts
 
of the self are experienced as more real, genuine or
 
authentic than others. He suggests that this may be
 
dependent on historical circumstances. At an earlier
 
time, people felt that the real self was expressed in
 
fulfilling one's self social roles, accepting responsi
 
bility for one's decisions, setting high standards of
 
behavior and living with ethical principles. Today, on
 
the other hand, the real self tends to be recognized as
 
an impulse; that is spontaneous, unreflective, emotion
 
al and free of facade. According to Turner, this
 
historical change should not be perceived as people
 
being closer to their real self in different terms.
 
They just construct it differently.
 
Berger, Levin, Jacobson and Millham (1977), howev
 
er, discuss the highly ritualized nature of social
 
behavior and notes that individuals manage impressions
 
with each performance they enact. They state that even
 
the most "spontaneous" situations are mere role-play
 
designed to manage the impressions of others. However,
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there are conceptions of individuals who often do not
 
recognize their ovm affective reactions.
 
This viewpoint only becomes tenable within certain
 
perspectives on the nature of emotion. Gazzaniga
 
(1985), among others, has noted that much of 2,000
 
years of Western thought has urged us to view the brain
 
as creating a unified cognitive process. Emotions were
 
formulated as the "interactions between the arousal
 
system and the cognitive-interpretive system" (Mandler,
 
1975, p. 65), where the cognitive system both incites
 
the affective arousal and determines its meaning. This
 
model leaves little room for self-deception about one's
 
emotional states (Sarbin, 1981; Szabados, 1985). If
 
the affect system is thought incapable of independent
 
assessment of sensory information, one's emotional
 
state becomes whatever the "cognitive-interpretive
 
system" decides it is (Schachter & Singer, 1962).
 
However, recent work on the complex nature of
 
hioman information processing and brain subsystems
 
(Fodor, 1983; Gazzaniga, 1985; Hilgard, 1986; McClel
 
land & Rumelhart, 1986) provides a very different
 
understanding of human nature. A psychobiological
 
perspective suggests that affects emanate, at least in
 
part, from sub-cortical centers that are semi-autono
 
mous from verbal information processing (MacLean, 1975;
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Panksepp, 1982). MacLean (1975) states that our
 
"paleomainrtialian brain" including the liittsic system has
 
its "own special kind of intelligence" and can function
 
somewhat independently from more recently developed
 
neocortical centers and notes that this phenomena "may
 
partly account for conflicts between what we affective
 
ly 'feel' and what we 'know'" (p. 81).
 
Affective specialization within the neocortex has
 
also been demonstrated. The frontal region of the
 
right cerebral hemisphere, which is connected to the
 
limbic system, seems to be particularly activated
 
during the generation and processing of many negative
 
affects (Davidson, 1984).
 
Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that the
 
emotion system interacting with other subsystems is
 
capable of conducting its own assessments of sensory
 
information (Izard, 1984; Leventhal, 1984). LeDoux
 
(1986) has recently reviewed neurological findings that
 
sensory messages are transmitted directly to regions of
 
the limbic system without initially being relayed
 
through the neocortex which is in accord with MacLean's
 
(1975) findings. It is well-known that the emotion
 
system, in part, specializes in anticipating whether
 
situations may require significant psychophysiological
 
preparation, such as for flight/fear response, physical
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coinbat or loss of deprivation/sadness (Schwartz, Wein
 
berger Sc. Singer, 1981).
 
How do we as individuals know which emotion is
 
appropriate to the situation? Recent research (Rose­
man, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) has begun to model
 
types of schematic processing (Leventhal, 1984) that
 
the emotion system employs in determining what specific
 
patterns of emotion seem warranted. For example,
 
sadness seems to reflect an assessment that an unpleas
 
ant situation is controlled by interpersonal circum
 
stances where the individual can do nothing to change
 
it. There is no direct introspective access to how the
 
emotion system constructs these appraisals; instead, we
 
rely on subjective experiences of resulting emotions
 
(Schwartz & Weinberger, 1980) and on inferences based
 
on implicit theories about what it must be doing
 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). From observations of split-

brain patients, Gazzaniga (1985) actually claims to
 
have identified an interpretive system with the left
 
hemisphere that specializes in constructing explanations
 
for behaviors and emotional responses generated by
 
other modules within the brain.
 
Although we have a preliminary understanding of
 
the complimentary dynamics of the cognitive-interpre
 
tive and affect systems, we do know that they can
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respond very differently to the same situation. An
 
exaitple is how they react to inputs from another brain
 
subsystem, i.e., the one that produces visual imagery
 
(Kosslyn, 1987). Having individuals image a threaten
 
ing scene of a disturbing motion picture reliably
 
incites specific patterns of emotion including differ
 
entiated autonomic Changes and facial expressions, even
 
though the person "knows" that the images pose no real
 
threat (Lang, 1979; Schwartz, Weinberger & Singer,
 
1981). Wolpe (1978) also noticed from a behavioral
 
perspective that neurotic patients are often afraid in
 
situations they acknowledge not to be objectively
 
dangerous imagery. This information is consistent with
 
data suggesting that conditioning of affective re
 
sponses can occur without involvement of the higher
 
cortex (LeDoux, 1986). Thus, emotional responses to
 
some degree have their own integrity, even when the
 
cognitive-interpretive system considers them irrational
 
or inappropriate (Ellis, 1987).
 
Current psychobiological research suggest that our
 
cognitive-interpretive and emotion systems can generate
 
quite discrepant assessments of the same stimuli.
 
Commonplace self-perceptions such as "I am really
 
feeling anxious even though I know there is no reason
 
to be" may be a valid reflection of the modular nature
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of hioman information processing. Psychologists readily
 
admit that not all individuals readily tolerate these
 
types of discrepancies suggesting that some invoke
 
defenses under these circxamstances and self-deceptively
 
reach false conclusions such as "I am not feeling
 
anxious because there is no reason to be."
 
Generally/ Dennett (1969) outlined two essential
 
types of awareness necessary to self-deception. First,
 
individuals are aware of a proposition if they can talk
 
about it. Secondly, the individual is aware of a
 
proposition if they cannot talk about it, but an ob
 
server could claim with justification that they are
 
considering that belief or proposition in their behav
 
ior. In psychoanalytic terms, the proposition is
 
either conscious or unconscious. Unconscious aware
 
ness, according to Dennett, is defined as the second
 
condition, but not the first because the individual
 
cannot sincerely recognize their behavior, but an
 
observer can reliably infer it.
 
Two additional criteria are necessary to conclude
 
that information is excluded from consciousness because
 
of a defensive process. First, the information must be
 
potentially available. Second, there must be clear
 
motivation for keeping it out of one's awareness
 
(Weinberger, 1990). Some aspects of the first crite­
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rion may be difficult to determine due to the accessi
 
bility of mental contents, such as specific memories or
 
interpretations of particular behaviors (Nisbett &
 
Ross, 1980). Freud's (1915/1957) definition of repres
 
sion that it required an effort not to know seems
 
particularly apt in this case. Emotions are, by defi
 
nition, psychophysiological responses that are diffi
 
cult to ignore. Very young children, who have not yet
 
developed inhibitory controls, have no trouble express
 
ing the fact that they are upset despite difficulties
 
articulating why. Therefore, if an affective state is
 
unconscious, it is reasonable to conclude that it is
 
not because we lack the capacity to know what we are
 
feeling.
 
With regard to the second criterion, psychoanalyt
 
ic theory states that information is not repressed
 
solely because it is unpleasant. Reality testing
 
remains intact when an individual remembers they have
 
experienced a death of a family member, been divorced
 
or had an illness. Within Gur and Sackeim's (1979)
 
framework, unconscious defenses entail active self-

deception in that one is motivated to keep something out
 
of the awareness because it is incompatible with a
 
conscious belief. Freud (1915/1957) felt that a person
 
represses an idea when it is incompatible with her/his
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ego. This formulation suggests that internal or exter
 
nal percepts become a target of defenses when they
 
directly or indirectly contradict strongly-held beliefs
 
about the self. Experiences of discrepancies between
 
these ideals and perceptions of our actual behavior are
 
themselves major sources of negative affects (Higgins,
 
Klein & Strauman, 1985). One strategy for reducing
 
this discomfort is to fail to recognize the discrepan
 
cies, For example, if one's self-concept (i.e., the
 
"self-respect of the ego") incorporates an idealized
 
image the one is not prone to certain affects and
 
impulses, defensive maneuvers may be undertaken to
 
exclude them from awareness (A. Freud, 1966).
 
In order to distinguish the effects of true high
 
self-esteem from defensive high self-esteem in any pen­
and-pencil measure of self-esteem or self-concept, a
 
reliable and valid procedure is necessary to identify
 
individuals prone to defensiveness. This entails use
 
of an individual difference strategy because psycholo
 
gists have noted some individuals are very repressive
 
and others are not. Since self-esteem assessments are
 
self-reports and subject to social desirability effects,
 
a serious confound occurs especially with subjects
 
reporting high SE. For example, for those who report
 
low levels of negative affect, the SE scales have not
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distinguished between repressers (who maladaptively
 
self-deceive themselves avoiding perceptions or nega
 
tive affects) and truly low anxious individuals who are
 
well-adjusted and maintain non-defensive higher levels
 
of SE (Weinberger, 1990). Thus, the relationship
 
between self-esteem and physical health should be
 
controlled for defensiveness partly because highly
 
defensive individuals who test high in self-esteem may
 
be unhealthy and have reported higher levels of physi
 
cal stress responses than low defensive individuals who
 
test high in self-esteem.
 
Summary
 
To investigate the relationship between global
 
self-esteem and physical health, the relationships
 
between an individual's affect, coping style or dispo
 
sition, and their physical health must be considered.
 
The dynamics of the relationship may be complex in
 
terms of describing the behavior of individuals with
 
varying levels of self-esteem. For example, the indi
 
vidual with valid HSE has less frequent negative self-

descriptions, uses less self-devaluation, experiences
 
less negative affect, has a more authentic self, and
 
expresses less defensiveness than either a person with
 
defensive high self-esteem or one with low self-esteem.
 
This translates into a more congruent self with a less
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disrupted identity in the face of stressful life events
 
because it allows the individual to feel that they can
 
deal more efficiently with, and better predict and
 
control, their social world. Thus, an individual who
 
feels more positive about themselves and their ability
 
to predict and control their environment may experience
 
less stress and negative affect when they encounter
 
life events, and conseguently, better physical health
 
in terms of normal levels of such physiological indica
 
tors as systolic and dystolic blood pressure, choles
 
terol, thyroxine and leukocytes.
 
Physiological Measures
 
Blood Pressure.
 
Recent psychosomatic theories of coronary
 
heart disease (CHD) and essential hypertension (EH)
 
have described the role of cardiovascular reactivity.
 
Cardiovascular reactivity refers to changes in a varie
 
ty of physiological parameters, including systolic
 
blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP)
 
in response to discrete environmental stimuli. These
 
physiological responses are hypothesized to contribute
 
1
 
to the development of CHD (Clarkson, Manuck & Kaplan,
 
1986) and EH (Obrist, 1981). Generally, these models
 
suggest that individuals with abnormal, frequent or
 
enduring cardiovascular responses to stressors are at
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greater risk for development of CHD or EH.
 
One important determinant of the degree of
 
cardiovascular reactivity elicited by stressors con
 
cerns the coping requirements of the situation. His
 
torically, it has been assumed that control over events
 
reduces physiological arousal, but this is most likely
 
true only when the exertion of control is very easy
 
(Solomon, Holmes & McCaul, 1980). Similar differences
 
are observed when active versus passive coping is
 
manipulated in the same task. Whether performing
 
reaction-time tasks (Light & Obrist, 1983) or solving
 
cognitive problems (Smith, Houston & Stucky, 1983) in
 
an attempt to avoid electric shock, or in attempting to
 
influence other people (Smith, Allred, Morrison &
 
Carlson, 1989), greater levels of SBP, heart rate, and
 
sometimes DBP occur than by passively coping with the
 
stimuli. Additionally, increased cardiovascular arous
 
al has been observed when subjects are anticipating
 
exerting effort in an active coping situation (Contra­
da, Wright & Glass, 1984). Easy coping tasks produce
 
lower levels of reactivity than do difficult tasks
 
(Solomon, Holmes, & McCaul, 1980).
 
Siltanen (1984) attempted to address these
 
concerns with a 10-year longitudinal study regarding
 
psychosomatic factors in CHD. Subjects were medically
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and psychologically examined in 1966, 1971 and 1976.
 
Subjects were initially divided into three groups: a)
 
completely healthy, b) ECG signs, but no CHD signs, and
 
3) symptomatic CHD patients. Subjects were age-matched
 
with no significant differences in occupation or stand
 
ard somatic risk factors. The findings were in large
 
agreement with results of earlier studies (Zyzanski,
 
Jenkins, Ryan, Flessas and Everist, 1976) that obtained
 
a positive correlation between angiographically docu
 
mented coronary artery sclerosis and anxiety and de
 
pression measured independently from clinical manifes
 
tations of CHD.
 
One Study (Karteroliotis and Gill, 1987)
 
tested undergraduate males for cognitive worry, somatic
 
anxiety, self-confidence, heart rate and blood pres
 
sure. Their results supported the relationship between
 
increased anxiety and cognitive worry and increased
 
levels of heart rate and blood pressure.
 
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to
 
stress and less subject to the effects of negative
 
affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that
 
HSE subjects would test lower in SBP and DBF than sub
 
jects who have LSE. These findings were expected to be
 
moderated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE
 
subjects who are not highly defensive.
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Cholesterol.
 
Although it has a negative connotation,
 
cholesterol is indispensable for body maintenance. Its
 
main function is to contribute to the build-up of cell
 
membranes, but it is also a basic substance for the
 
production of bile acids in the liver and gonadal
 
hormones. The body produces 80 to 90 percent of the
 
body's cholesterol. The rest comes from ingested
 
foods. There are two kinds of cholesterol known as
 
lipoproteins. High-density lipoprotein (HDL) is bene
 
ficial serving to keep arteries clean and elastic.
 
Low-density lipoprotein (LDL) is associated with coro
 
nary heart attacks because it embeds itself in the
 
arterial walls, beginning to narrow and harden the
 
artery so that blood can only pass through with great
 
effort for the heart and much higher pressure in the
 
arteries (Rice, 1987). For the purposes of this paper,
 
the term cholesterol is meant to describe the harmful
 
LDL cholesterol.
 
The contribution of diet to cholesterol was
 
investigated by Connor and Conner (1977). After a
 
period of a cholesterol-free diet, 25 subjects were
 
given twice the average daily amount of cholesterol
 
(1000 mg.). Still, the increase of cholesterol was
 
relatively small (from 210 to 245 mg. percent (mglOO
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ml), noarmal values ranging from 150 to 270 mg%). A
 
feedback system in the body inhibits the endogenous
 
cholesterol production when nutrition uptake is in
 
creased. Hence, nutrition can, indeed, increase cho
 
lesterol level, but its effects should not be overesti
 
mated (Rice, 1987).
 
Independent of any controversy concerning the
 
nutritional contributions of cholesterol, the status of
 
cholesterol as a risk factor is beyond dispute. In the
 
study by Kannel, Castelli, Gordon and McNamara (1971),
 
its relation to CHD applied to both sexes and was
 
strongest in the 30-49 year age group. The relation
 
between one's cholesterol level and risk seems to be
 
continuous since there is no "critical level" found to
 
discriminate between risk and no-risk individuals. The
 
CHD risk of subjects in the upper 20 percent of the
 
distribution of cholesterol values was 2.4 times that
 
of subjects in the lowest 20 percent.
 
Increases in cholesterol levels have been
 
found with changes in mood. Psychological stress
 
originates from a subjective appraisal of the total
 
situation and can lead to emotions such as fear and
 
depression. Different studies have evaluated the
 
relationship between changes in mood, psychological
 
stress and its effect on cholesterol levels.
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In one study involving frogmen, Rahe, et al.
 
(1968) found a rise in cholesterol during periods when
 
anxiety and discomfort were reported. Subjects moods
 
and cholesterol levels were tested periodically over a
 
two-month period. Results indicated positive correla
 
tions of cholesterol with depression, fear and anger,
 
and negative correlations with motivation, happiness
 
and arousal. The strongest correlation was between
 
depression and cholesterol in five of the 16 sessions
 
tested (Rahe, et al., 1971). In another study, unem
 
ployed men were evaluated by nurses for anxiety, sad
 
ness and self-esteem. Those subjects judged depressed
 
invariably manifested elevated cholesterol levels
 
(Kasl, Cobb & Brooks, 1968).
 
Segers and Mertens (1976) explored the cho
 
lesterol-psychological relationship in two age groups
 
(above and below 45 years of age) which were further
 
subgrouped according to weight (underweight, normal,
 
obese). Significant findings occurred between both
 
depression and anxiety and cholesterol in the young
 
obese group because of the influence of mood on eating
 
behaviors. The observation was made that under stress
 
ful conditions, individuals with generally high choles
 
terol levels reacted by increasing food consumption,
 
whereas those with normal cholesterol levels tended to
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respond with a decrease in appetite.
 
In a study by Jenkins, James and Zyzanski
 
(1969) exploring the relationship between cholesterol
 
and 18 scales of the the California Personality Inven
 
tory, two main dimensions were associated with high
 
cholesterol: overactivity (competition, aggression and
 
impatience) and overcontrol (responsibility, conform­
ism, and low self-esteem). van Boornen and Orlebeke
 
(1982) investigated relationships between personality
 
variables, general cholesterol levels, and cholesterol
 
response to stressors. Personality variables measured
 
were depression, neuroticism, debilitating anxiety and
 
achievement motivation. In contrast to other findings,
 
the only significant correlations occurred with
 
achievement motivation and a stress-induced cholesterol
 
rise and this was predominately attributed to male
 
subjects.
 
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to
 
stress, and less subject to the effects of negative
 
affect and depression, it was expected that HSE sub
 
jects have lower cholesterol levels than than subjects
 
who have LSE. These findings were expected to be moder
 
ated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE sub
 
jects who are not highly defensive.
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Thyroxine.
 
Zack and Ackerman (1988) offered three models
 
of thyroid function, metabolic regulation and depres
 
sion: a) Model 1; Depressive symptoms are primary,
 
changes in thyroid function and metabolic rate are
 
secondary, b) Model 2: Change in metabolic rate is
 
primary, changes in thyroid function and depressive
 
symptoms are secondary, and c) Model 3: Thyroid changes
 
are primary, changes in energy balance and depressive
 
symptoms are secondary because there has been no theory
 
to explain why weight loss occurs in some depressions
 
and weight gain in others. These models are said to
 
represent different pathophysiologic states which are
 
equally likely to occur, and Zack and Ackerman suggest
 
ed further research to test these models.
 
The hypothalamic-pituitary-thyroid axis
 
effect on mood has been a subject of research since
 
both increases and decreases of thyroid indices have
 
been linked with mood disorders. Depressed patients
 
have been found to have blunted thyroid-stimulating
 
hormone (TSH) responses to thyrotropin-releasing hor
 
mone (TRH) in comparison to patients with other psychi
 
atric illnesses and normal controls (Extein, Pottash &
 
Gold, 1981; Kirkegaard, Bjorum, Cogn & Lauridsen,
 
1978). The proportion of depressed patients with a
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blunted TSH response to TRH has been found to vary from
 
25% to 70% across different studies (Loosen & Prange,
 
1982). More recently, the TKH-test has been suggested
 
as a diagnostic aid in major depressive disorders
 
(Extein, et al., 1981; Targum, Sullivan, & Byrnes,
 
1982).
 
The significance of the blunted TSH response
 
to TRH in depressives is unclear. Hatotani, Nomura,
 
Yamaguchi and Kitayam (1970) suggest that it may be due
 
to reduced thyroid function; whereas. Loosen and Prange
 
(1982) state that during depression there is hyperse­
cretion of TRH with a transient increase in thyroid
 
activity, producing blunting by negative feedback.
 
However, longitudinal studies, and those assessing
 
thyroid function during depressive episodes and again
 
after recovery, suggest that thyroid levels are high
 
during depression and fall on recovery (Board, Wadeson,
 
& Persky, 1957; Kirkegaard & Faber, 1981).
 
Raised cortisol levels may also cause blunt
 
ing of the TSH response (Loosen, Prange & Wilson,
 
1978). A study by Agren and Wide (1982) reported an
 
inverse relationship between TSH response and cortisol
 
levels, but this association was not confirmed by Gold,
 
Pottash, Ryan, Sweeney, Davies and Martin (1980) and
 
Davis, et al. (1981). Galloway, Dolan, Fonagy, De
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Souza, and Wakeling (1984) suggest that more than one
 
mechanism may be responsible for the blunted TSH re
 
sponse in depressed patients> such as weight loss,
 
reduced intake, or other metabolic factors.
 
Munjack and Palmer (1988) tested 52 adult
 
patients diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder
 
for more than 6 months, 41 adult patients with either
 
panic disorder or panic disorder with agoraphobia, and
 
14 controls who had been screened for thyroid disease
 
and found no significant differences in thyroid func
 
tion between groups. However, Argue, Segura and Torru­
bia (1987) found a positive relationship between de
 
pression and anxiety and thyroxine, and a negative
 
relationship between hypomania and thyroxine when
 
comparing 44 psychosomatic and 13 healthy subjects.
 
Brayshaw and Brayshaw (1986) found 51 of 54 women with
 
premenstrual syndrome (PMS) showed evidence of thyroid
 
misfunction and 34 women found relief when a synthetic
 
thyroxine supplement was administered. As stated
 
earlier, thyroxine levels are affected by mood and
 
stress but studies have indicated bi-directional re
 
sults.
 
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to
 
stress and less subject to the effects of negative
 
affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that
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HSE subjects have lower thyroxine levels compared to
 
LSE subjects. These findings werre expected to be
 
moderated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE
 
subjects who are not highly defensive.
 
Leukocytes.
 
Stressful events have been known to have
 
adverse effects on health, and the immune system is
 
thought to be an important mediator between aversive
 
events and infectious disease (Ader, 1981; Borysenko,
 
1984). There is substantial evidence that natural
 
killer (NK) cell activity has an important role in the
 
body's defense against illnesses (Herberman, 1982).
 
Interferon is a major regulator of NK cell activity,
 
because it can affect both the growth and differentia
 
tion of NK cells from their progenitor cells.
 
Glaser, Rice, Speicher, Stout, and Kiecolt-

Glaser (1986) addressed the effects of commonplace
 
stress on interferon production and NK cell activity
 
and numbers by testing 40 medical students before and
 
after examinations and found the IFN levels produced by
 
peripheral blood leukocytes were significantly lower
 
after stress, and the NK cell activity was also signif
 
icantly lower than baseline, having controlled for poor
 
nutrition. Other studies (Glaser, Kiecolt-Glaser,
 
Speicher & Holliday, 1985; Glaser, Kiecolt-Glaser,
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stout, et al., 1985) support the reliability and perva
 
siveness of the iinmunodepressive effects of acute
 
stress on the immune system again controlling for
 
variations of sleep and nutrition. Glaser, et al.
 
(1985) state "longer-term stress-related alterations in
 
cellular immunity may carry an increased risk for
 
immunodeficiency disorders and malignant and infectious
 
disease" (p. 678).
 
Earlier studies with rodents suggested that
 
stress-related changes in IFN production were found in
 
virus-infected mice following application of shock
 
(Chang & Rasmussen, 1965) and restraint (Steplweski &
 
Vogel, 1986). For example, after 11 days of restraint
 
stress, the mice's leukocytes count fell about 50% and
 
after a 12 day recovery period, normal leukocyte was
 
restored (Steplweski & Vogel, 1986).
 
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to
 
stress and less subject to the effects of negative
 
affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that
 
HSE subjects have higher leukocyte levels than subjects
 
with LSE. These effects were expected to be moderated
 
by defensiveness and were expected for HSE subjects who
 
are not highly defensive.
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PILOT STUDY
 
Introduction
 
The data for the main study were obtained from
 
medical records provided by the Yale Behavioral Medi
 
cine Clinic, an outpatient service that evaluates and
 
treats mostly stress-related disorders. Since no direct
 
measure of self-esteem was included in the test battery
 
used by the Yale Behavioral Medical Clinic, a Self-

Esteem Questionnaire was developed using specific items
 
from measures available, such as the Beck Depression
 
Inventory (BDI), Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS),
 
SCL-90-R Questionnaire that on face value measured
 
dimensions of self-esteem. In order to verify that the
 
proposed Self-Esteem Questionnaire was measuring self-

esteem, a pilot Study was developed to select items
 
from the above cited available measures for the ques
 
tionnaire.
 
Method
 
Subjects
 
Twenty university college students who were taking
 
psychology classes volunteered for this portion of the
 
research.
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Self-Esteem Questionnaire Development
 
From the available personality measures in the
 
above cited test battery (e.g., BDI, TMAS, and SCL-90­
R), 38 items were selected on face value that appeared
 
to measure self-esteem (i.e., "I am happy most of the
 
time").
 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965) was includ
 
ed in the pilot instrumeht in orderselect items and to
 
assess the construct validity of the proposed Self-

Esteern Questionnaire using item analysis. A copy of
 
the Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Pilot Study) is listed
 
as Appendix A.
 
Rosenberg's (1962a) Self-Esteem Scale was de
 
veloped to measure the self-acceptance aspects of self-

esteem. The scale was originally designed for use with
 
high school students. Norms were developed by randomly
 
selecting 10 high schools in New York testing 5,024
 
students. The scale consists of 10-items, and accord
 
ing to Rosenberg (1965) it is valid to score it as a
 
simple additive scale.
 
The Self-Esteem Scale was designed to be a unidi­
mensional measure specifically with brevity and ease of
 
administration. High self-esteem indicates respect for
 
oneself and a feeling of self-worth, but not feeling
 
superior to others; whereas, low self-esteem indicates
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both a lack of self-respect and feelings of inadequacy.
 
Silber and Tippett (1965) found the Guttman scale repro­
ducibility coefficient as .92 with Coopersmith Self-

Esteem Inventory a correlation of .59 indicating the
 
items have a high internal and construct reliability.
 
Test-retest correlation over two weeks was .85. Evi
 
dence of the construct validity appears in a high
 
correlation between the Self-Esteem Scale and a scale
 
of depressive affect (Rosenberg, 1962a) and a measure-

of psychophysiological indicators of anxiety (Rosen
 
berg, 1962b).
 
The scale is criticized by Nunnally (1967) who
 
states that the small number of items and forced rec
 
tangular distribution of items in Guttman scales are
 
artificial and likely to produce gross ordinal distri
 
butions between people. Notwithstanding this criti
 
cism, this scale has become widely used as a quick
 
assessment of self-esteem.
 
The Symptom Check List-90-Revised (SCL-R-90) is a
 
90-item, self-report inventory designed to assess
 
psychological symptoms of medical and psychiatric
 
patients. The inventory measures somatization, obses
 
sive-compulsive symptoms, interpersonal sensitivity,
 
depression, anxiety, phobic anxiety, psychoticism,
 
paranoid ideation, hostility and global indices of
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psychopathology originally developed by the Clinical
 
Psychoraetrics Research Unit of Johns Mopkins Universi
 
ty. All items have a 5-point response scale (Derogatis
 
& Melisaratos, 1983).
 
Although this is a very brief scale by comparison
 
with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
 
(MMPI), and some factors are measured by as few as 6
 
items, its reliability is remarkably high. Measures of
 
factor internal consistency range from .77 (psychoti­
cism) to .90 (depression), and test-retest (1 week
 
apart) correlation coefficients range from .78 (hostil
 
ity) to .90 (phobic anxiety) in a psychiatric popula
 
tion (Derogatis, Rickels & Rock, 1976).
 
The most impressive set of research studies is
 
concerned with the use of the SCL-90-R in depression.
 
Several investigators have reported significant corre
 
lations between the SCIj-90-R symptom subscale scores
 
and measures of analogous constructs and similar dimen
 
sions measured by the MMPI (Derogatis, Rickels & Rock,
 
1976; Dinning & Evans, 1977). Further, Derogatis and
 
Cleary (1977) describe results of a confirmatory factor
 
analysis on data from 1,000 psychiatric outpatients.
 
They interpreted their findings to show a reasonably
 
good match between empirical findings and the hypothe
 
sized symptom structure in eight of the nine areas
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measured by the test. Generally positive confirmatory
 
factor analyses have also been reported in studies of
 
neurotic patients (Jerabek, Klimpl & Boleloucky, 1982).
 
The SCL-90-R is a widely used self-report measure of
 
psychopathology with sound psychometric properties,
 
including high levels of internal consistency and
 
temporal stability. The weaknesses of the SCL-90-R are
 
similar to those of many self-report instruments; 1)
 
there is an assumption that the research subject will
 
accurately describe symptoms and behavior (Derogatis &
 
Melisaratos, 1983; Wilde, 1972), 2) that response bias
 
or social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) do not
 
contribute to scores in a systematic fashion, and 3)
 
that there is an equivocal concordance between patient
 
reports and clinical ratings.
 
For the purpose of this study, fourteen items from
 
the SCL-R-90 were selected which appeared to measure
 
aspects of negative self-concept, depression or anxie
 
ty. Examples of some items are "Feeling that people
 
are unfriendly or dislike you," or "Feeling inferior to
 
others." The complete list of items is shown in Appen
 
dix A.
 
The Beck Depression Inventory was developed by
 
Beck (1967, 1970). He was one of the first psycholo
 
gists to offer a cognitive theory of depression because
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he had observed that depressed people had a negative
 
view of themselves, were pessimistic about the future
 
and had a tendency to interpret ongoing events in a
 
negative manner. In 1970, Beck developed the Beck
 
Depression Inventory (BDI) which measures the presence
 
and degree of depression in adolescents and adults and
 
has been widely accepted in psychology as a simple and
 
quick tool in assessing the presence and depth of
 
depression. One study demonstrated a correlation
 
of .77 between the BDI and psychiatric rating using
 
university students as subjects (Bumberry, Oliver, &
 
McClure, 1978). Other measures of validity have been
 
undertaken by comparing the results of the BDI with
 
other measures of depression, such as the Depression
 
Adjective Checklist and the Minnesota Multiphasic
 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) (Reynolds, et al., 1981).
 
Each item of the BDI corresponds to a specific
 
category of depressive symptom and/or attitude. Each
 
category was designed to describe a specific behavioral
 
manifestation of depression. Of the 21 items, only
 
nine items were hypothesized to measure aspects of
 
self-esteem, for example; sadness (negative affect);
 
pessimism (stability); sense of failure (self-confi
 
dence); dissatisfaction (self-image); and self-dislike
 
(self-esteem). Each item consists of a graded series
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of four self-evaluative statements that are rank or
 
dered and weighted according to the severity of the
 
symptom from neutral to maximiom severity. For example,
 
sense of failure (self-confidence) consists of the
 
following range of severity from "I feel I am a com
 
plete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife)" to
 
"I do not feel like a failure." A complete list of the
 
selected BDI items are listed in Appendix A, Self-

Esteem Questionnaire - Pilot Study.
 
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1951)
 
was developed for use in a study of eyelid conditioning
 
by taking items from the MMPI which allegedly described
 
anxiety reactions. The scale went through several
 
modifications and presently consists of 50 items now
 
known as the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
 
1953). The test norms were developed with various
 
groups such as university students in Iowa, airmen
 
tested at the beginning of their basic |:raining at an
 
Air Force Base, and university students at Northwestern
 
in a repeated measures design. The test-retest coeffi
 
cient was found to be .89 after 3 weeks (n=163), .82
 
over 5 months (n=113), and .81 after 9-17 months
 
(n=50). Additionally no appreciable sex differences,
 
no practice effects, and no differences in scores
 
attributable to variations in filler items were noted
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(Holtzman, Calvin & Bitterroan, 1952).
 
Fifteen items were taken from the Taylor Manifest
 
Anxiety Scale and used in the Self-Esteem Question
 
naire. For example, one item is "I am certainly lack
 
ing in self-confidence." A complete list can be re
 
viewed in Appendix A.
 
Results
 
In order to develop a Self-Esteem scale and esti
 
mate the construct validity of the new Self-Esteem
 
Questionnaire, only 15 items that comprised the highest
 
correlation (r>.43) with the summated Rosenberg Self-

Esteem Scale were used. See Table 1 for the results
 
and final items.
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TABLE 1.
 
Inter-Item Correlations between Rosenbei:q's
 
Self-Esteem Scale and Self-Esteem Items and Alpha
 
Levels.
 
Corrected
 
Self-Esteem Item - Alpha
 
Questionnaire Rosenberg SE If Item
 
Items Correlation Deleted
 
B7 .486 .895
 
T5 .539 .884
 
T7 .577 .882
 
T12 .574 .883
 
T13 .470 .885
 
SI .481 .884
 
S2 .629 .878
 
S3 .477 .883
 
S4 .466 .887
 
S5 .707 .873
 
S6 .456 .884
 
S8 .614 .878
 
S12 .804 .868
 
S13 .730 .872
 
S14 .682 .874
 
Note. N = 20; B = Beck Depression Inventory;
 
T = Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; S = Symptom Check
 
List-90-Revised.
 
The final version of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire
 
had an overall alpha Of .8997. Split-half reliability
 
was .7821 for the first eight items, and .8612 for the
 
last seven items.
 
Of the original 15 SCL-R-90 items selected, only
 
10 had significant correlations with Rosenberg's Self-

Esteem Scale. An example of a significant SCL-R-90
 
item is "Feeling inferior to others." Of the original
 
nine BDI items tested, only one had a significant
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correlation with Rosenberg's Self Esteem Scale. That
 
item was "sense of failure (self-confidence). From the
 
15 TMAS items chosen, only four had significant corre
 
lations with Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale. An example
 
of such an item is "I feel I am no good at all." In
 
order to differentiate high and low self esteem scores,
 
the median split of 9.0 was used. See Table 2 for the
 
final version of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire.
 
TABLE 2.
 
Self-Esteem Questionnaire ^ Final Version.
 
Choice of one or more items.
 
1. 	 (Beck-Social Withdrawal)
 
a. 	I have lot all of my interest in other people
 
and don't care about them at all.
 
b. 	I have lost more of my interest in other
 
people and have little feeling for them.
 
c. 	I am less interested in other people than I
 
used to be.
 
d. I have not lost interest in other people.
 
True/False Choice.
 
2. 	 Life is a strain for me much of the time. (Taylor)
 
3. 	 I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
 
(Taylor)
 
4. 	I am certainly lacking in self-confidence. (Taylor)
 
5. 	I am happy most of the time. (Taylor)
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Choose Descriptors: A. Not at all
 
B. A little bit
 
C. Moderately
 
D. Quite a bit
 
E. Extremely
 
6. 	Feeling that others do not understand you or
 
are unsympathetic. (SCL-R-90)
 
7. 	Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you.
 
{SCL-R-9G)
 
8. Feeling inferior to others. (SCL-R-90)
 
9. 	Feeling uneasy when people are watching or talking
 
about you. (SCL-R-90)
 
10. 	Feeling very self-conscious with others.
 
(SCL-R-90)
 
11. 	Feeling uncomfortable about eating or drinking
 
in public. (SCL-R-90)
 
12. 	Difficulty making decisions. (SCL-R-90)
 
13. 	Blaming yourself for things. (SCL-R-90)
 
14. 	Feeling hopeless about the future. (SCL-R-90)
 
15. 	Feeling of worthlessness. (SCL-R-90)
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PHYSIOLQGlCAIi STUDY
 
Method
 
SubiectB
 
The medical records of 183 patients (76 males/107
 
females) on whom complete computer data was available
 
were selected for the main study. These subjects had
 
presented themselves during the period of 1981 to 1983
 
to the Yale Behavioral Medicine Clinic.
 
Sample means and standard deviations for the
 
subjects' age and weight are presented by gender in
 
Table 3.
 
TABLE 3.
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects' Age and
 
Weight bv Gender.
 
GENDER
 
Men Women
 
Variable n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Age (Years) 76 38.19 14.30 107 . 40.57 15.26
 
Weight (lbs.) 76 180.97 38.86 107 142.78 36.11
 
The effects of gender were examined using multiple
 
regression. Age was not significant, but weight was
 
found to be significant F(2)=24.302, p<.00. Addition­
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ally, when smoking habits was examined by gender, 48
 
(63.16%) of the men smoked, while 28 (36.84%) did not.
 
Of the 107 women, 70 (65,42%) smoked and 37 (34.58%)
 
did not.
 
Medical Tests
 
All patients who participated in this study at the
 
clinic received an initial psychological assessment and
 
routine blood and urine tests prior to being examined
 
by a physician. The single blood sample was drawn
 
between 2:00 and 4:30 p.m. on the day of the psycholog
 
ical assessment and was analyzed by the Yale - New
 
Haven Hospital, Clinical Hematology Laboratory for the
 
cholesterol, white blood count (leukocyte), and thyrox­
ine evaluation. CBC differentials were derived using
 
manual inspection and counting techniques by trained
 
laboratory personnel. Blood pressure was measured by
 
the examining physician using a sphygmomanometer, an
 
instrument consisting of an inflatable cuff placed
 
around the upper left arm, and a stethoscope. Medical
 
histories, including self-reports of current medica
 
tions and smoking habits, were also obtained from all
 
patients.
 
Psychological Tests
 
Behavioral Medicine Clinic psychological staff
 
administered a battery of psychological tests immedi­
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ately following the medical testing. The psychological
 
tests that pertain to this study included the Beck
 
Depression Inventory (EDI), Taylor Manifest Anxiety
 
Scale (TMAS), SCL-90-R Questionnaire, and Marlowe-

Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS).
 
Defensiveness was controlled by the use of the
 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. In 1960,
 
Crowne and Marlowe developed the MCSDS to discriminate
 
defensive versus non-defensive individuals reporting
 
low distress. By 1964, Crowne and Marlowe realized
 
that their scale was primarily measuring a substantive
 
individual difference dimension rather than response
 
bias which has been confirmed by a formidable body of
 
research (Arkin & Lake, 1983; Nordholm, 1974; McCrae &
 
Costa, 1983; Wiesenthal, 1974).
 
Current evidence is most consistent with the
 
interpretation that high scorers on the MCSDS generally
 
believe what they are reporting and attempt to behave
 
accordingly. Close friends of high scores confirmed
 
that these subjects actually try to conform to the
 
rigid standards of self-control outlined in the test
 
(Strahan & Strahan, 1972).
 
For low-scorers on the Marlowe-Crowne (1960,
 
1964), "socially desirable" responses may be agreeing
 
that certain perceived universals about human nature
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also apply to them. However, they simply consider it
 
untenable to deny statements such as "I sometimes feel
 
resentful when I don't get my way." It is common
 
knowledge that individuals who make implausible claims
 
are often suspected of lying, and blatant lying is not
 
considered "socially desirable." Whereas, high scorers
 
must believe they are at least capable of extraordinary
 
self-control reflected in those items. Otherwise, they
 
too would consider it untenable to make such claims
 
(Kraut, 1978).
 
Since Crowne and Marlowe (1960) used the normed
 
mean score of 13.72 and Standard deviation of 5.78 to
 
differentiate low and high defensiveness groups, this
 
same mean and standard deviation was used to divide our
 
subjects into similar groups. Sample means and stand
 
ard deviations for the subjects' defensiveness are
 
presented by gender in Table 4.
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TABLE 4.
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects'
 
Defensiveness bv Gender.
 
GENDER
 
Men Women
 
Variable n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Defensiveness 76 15.76 6.03 107 16.88 6.38
 
Note. According to Cfowne & Marlowe (1960), the normed
 
mean for the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
 
is 13.72 with a standard deviation of 5.78.
 
Defensiveness was not found significant when exam
 
ining the effects of gender in a multiple regression
 
equation.
 
An example of an MCSDS item is "I never hesitate
 
to go out of my way to help someone in trouble." A
 
complete version of the MCSDS scale is shown in Appen
 
dix B.
 
Results
 
Self-esteem and defensiveness served as independ
 
ent variables, while the physiological measures (blood
 
pressure, cholesterol, thyroxine and luekocytes) were
 
dependant variables. Sex, age, weight and smoking
 
habits were used as control variables.
 
Prior to analysis, self-esteem, defensiveness,
 
62
 
sex, age, weight, smoke, cholesterol, thyroxine, lym
 
phocytes, systolic and diastolic blood pressure were
 
examined through Systat programs for accuracy of data
 
entry, missing values, and fit between their distribu
 
tions and the assumptions of multivariate analysis.
 
Cases with missing values in self-esteem, defensive­
ness, sex, age, weight and smoke were deleted, leaving
 
183 cases for analysis.
 
Self-Esteem
 
The means and standard deviations of self-esteem
 
and defensiveness for high and low self-esteem and
 
defensiveness groups by gender are presented in Table
 
5. in order to determine if the distributions of defen
 
siveness and self-esteem were similar for men and
 
women.
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TABLE 5.
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Esteem
 
and Defensiveness bv High and Low Self-Esteem^ and
 
Defensiveness" Groups bv Gender.
 
GROUPS
 
Gender HSE/LDef HSE/HDef LSE/LDef LSE/HDef
 
Males (n=76) 
n 15 19 17 25 
Mean SE 4.13 3.84 22.94 23.08 
SD 3.16 2.73 6.66 9.71 
Mean Def 10.33 20.21 9.64 19.84 
SD 3.50 3.47 3.16 3.61 
Females (n=107)
 
n 28 25 13 41
 
Mean SE 3.21 4.40 23.54 23.63
 
SD 2.88 3.76 7.53 8.06
 
Mean Def 10.54 20.16 10.92 21.10
 
SD 3.05 4.19 3.57 4.74
 
Note. ^Self-esteem groups were split using the
 
median score of 9.00. ®Defensiveness groups were split
 
according to Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) normed mean
 
of 13.72.
 
Further, the correlations between self-esteem and
 
defensiveness for men r=-.060 and women r=.191 indicat
 
ed no relationship between the two variables.
 
These tables indicate that the method used to
 
split the groups resulted in clear demarcations.
 
Systolic Blood Pressure.
 
The means for systolic blood pressure for
 
self-esteem and defensiveness are depicted on Table 6.
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TABLE 6.
 
Mean Systolic Blood Pressure Levels bv Self-Esteem
 
and De£ensiveness.
 
SELF-ESTEEM
 
High Low
 
DEFENSIVENESS n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Low 32 132.81 16.80 18 143.72 17.68
 
High 20 135.00 18.03 40 139.20 23.82
 
Note. n=110. Overall mean was 135.84, SD 19.90.
 
The above table of means without controls
 
suggests that self-esteem controlled by defensiveness
 
did influence systolic blood pressure. However, using
 
multiple regression, neither self-esteem, defensiveness
 
or the interaction between self-esteem and defensive
 
ness was found significant. When the control variables
 
(sex, age, weight and smoke) were added to the multiple
 
regression, the effects of self-esteem, defensiveness
 
and the interaction still were not significant, al
 
though both age and weight were individually signifi
 
cant, Multiple r=.625, F(7)=9.318, p<.00.
 
Diastolic Blood Pressure.
 
As a test for multicollinearity of the data,
 
a pairwise correlation matrix was examined. See Table
 
7 for the results.
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TABLE 7.
 
Pearson Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Diastolic
 
Blood Pressure.
 
Dias. Self-

BP Esteem Def. Age Weight Smoke
 
Diastolic Blood 
Pressure 1.000 
Self-Esteem 0.039 1.000 
Defensiveness 0.146 0.087 1.000 
Age 0.301 0.159 0.158 1.000 
Weight 0.415 -0.030 0.044 0.148 1.000 
Smoke -0.169 0.148 0.027 0.033 -0.102 1.000 
Note. n=110. All other variables had n=183.
 
Examination of the pairwise correlations did
 
not indicate multicollinearity of the data.
 
The means of diastolic blood pressures for
 
self-esteem and defensiveness are depicted in Table 8.
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TABLE 8.
 
Mean Diastolic Blood Pressure Levels bv Self-Esteem
 
and Defensiveness.
 
SELF-ESTEEM
 
High Low
 
DEFENSIVENESS n Mean SD h Mean SD
 
Low 32 86.28 10.73 i8 84.00 13.05
 
High 20 87.55 12.24 ~ 40 89.05 13.14
 
Note. n=110. Overall mean was 87.14, SD 12.26.
 
Inspection of the table of means without use
 
of controls suggests that the effects of defensiveness
 
appear to depend on self-esteem rather than the re
 
verse. Among the LSE subjects, a greater difference in
 
diastolic blood pressure as a function of defensiveness
 
was found than with high self-esteem groups.
 
Using muliple regression, when self-esteem,
 
defensiveness and their interaction was tested, the
 
interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness
 
indicated a trend, t(3)=1.88, ^ <-063, Multiple r=.230,
 
r =.053. When the control variables, weight and sex,
 
were added to the regression, the interaction of self-

esteem and defensiveness was significant, t,(5)=2.04,
 
£<.04, Multiple r=.468, =.219. However, the highest
 
predictability (rf.=.280, r =.529) for diastolic blood
 
pressure occurred when self-esteem, defensiveness.
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their interaction, and the Gontrol variables of weight,
 
age and smoke were combined. In this equation, only
 
weight and age were significant £<.01.
 
In an attempt to further analyze the signifi
 
cant effects of interaction between self-esteem and
 
defensiveness on diastolic blood pressure, this same
 
group of variables was analyzed using stepwise regres
 
sion with and without the inclusion of the interaction
 
between self-esteem and defensiveness. The interaction
 
did not contribute to the equation.
 
Since Systat did not have a hierarchical
 
regression model, a regression analysis of diastolic
 
blood pressure with and without the interaction of
 
self-esteem and defensiveness was performed including
 
various combinations of the control variables of
 
weight, age, and smoke in order to interpret the re
 
sults of the interaction. Table ? presents the re
 
sults.
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TABLE 9.
 
Summary of Hierarchical Analysis for Interaction
 
between Self-Esteem and Defehsiveness for Diastolic
 
Blood Pressure.
 
No Interaction interaction
 
Control P Residual R^ Control P Residual R^
 
SE/Def .177
 
Weight .000 13570.11 .172 Weight .000 13339.74 .186
 
SE/Def .411
 
Weight .000 Weight .000
 
Age .002 12421.35 .242 Age .004 12342.03 .247
 
SE/Def .099
 
weight .000 Weight .000
 
Smoke .181 13343.88 .186 Smoke .101 13003.26 .207
 
SE/Def .441
 
Age .001 14907.87 .091 Age .003 14824.91 .096
 
SE/Def .240
 
Age .001 Age .002
 
Smoke .048 14371.32 .123 Smoke .031 14184.50 .135
 
SE/Def .087
 
Smoke .077 15925.50 .029 Smoke .038 15492.50 .055
 
SE/Def .151
 
Age .004 Age .007
 
Weight .000 Weight .000
 
Smoke .094 12052.73 .265 Smoke .145 11812.69 .280
 
Note, n = 110, 73 cases deleted due to missing data.
 
With every combination of the independent varia­
bles, note the change in R with and without the inter
 
action. In each case, the inclusion of the interaction
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between self-esteem and defensiveness slightly reduced
 
the residual term and inereased the squared multiple R,
 
thereby mimimally increasing the predictability of the
 
effects on diastolic blood pressure. Therefore, the
 
interaction of self-esteem and defensiveness contribut
 
ed minimally or not at all depending on the regression
 
method used.
 
Cholesterol.
 
The means of cholesterol for self-esteem and
 
defensiveness is depicted on Table 10.
 
TABLE 10.
 
Mean Cholesterol Levels bv Self-Esteem and
 
Defensiveness.
 
SELF-ESTEEM
 
High Low
 
DEFENSIVENESS n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Low 34 201.73 41.19 24 200.42 50.94
 
37 209.54 33,29 57 216.77 49.85
 
Note. n=152. Overall mean was 209.07, SD 44.70.
 
Using multiple regression, there was no sig
 
nificant effect of either self-esteem or defensiveness
 
on cholesterol with or without the interaction of self-

esteem and defensiveness. When the control variables
 
(sex, age, etc.) were added to the multiple regression.
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neither self-esteem, defensiveness or their interaction
 
were significant, although both age and weight were
 
significant with and without the interaction, ^ <'00 and
 
n<.05, respectively.
 
Thyroxine.
 
The means of thyroxine for self-esteem and
 
defensiveness is depicted on Table 11.
 
TABLE 11.
 
Mean Thyroxine Levels by Self-Esteem and Defensiveness.
 
SELF-ESTEEM
 
High Low
 
DEFENSIVENESS n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Low 36 7.01 1.54 26 7.13 1.59
 
High 38 7.51 1.95 58 7.83 2.06
 
Note. n=158. Overall mean was 7.45, SD 1.87.
 
There was no significant effect of self-

esteem on thyroxine with or with the interaction of
 
self-esteem and defensivness.
 
Defensiveness was found to have an overall
 
significant effect on thyroxine only when no interac
 
tion of self-esteem and defensiveness was included in
 
the equation. Defensiveness remained a significant
 
effect when the controls were added individually or in
 
combination. High defensive subjects had significantly
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higher levels of thyroxine than low defensive subjects.
 
When the interaction for self-esteem and defensiveness
 
was included in the multiple regression, the effects of
 
defensiveness were no longer significant with or with
 
out the controls.
 
Leukocytes.
 
The means of leukocyte levels for self-esteem
 
and defensiveness is depicted on Table 12.
 
TABLE 12.
 
Mean Leukocyte Levels Bv Self-Esteem and Defensiveness.
 
SELF-ESTEEM
 
High Low
 
DEFENSIVENESS n Mean SD n Mean SD
 
Low 35 28.12 7.71 24 25.90 8.64
 
High 35 26.98 9.25 53 28.21 9.49
 
Note. n=147. Overall mean was 27.52, SD 8.85.
 
Review of the above means indicate that
 
neither self-esteem or defensiveness without the con
 
trol variables had an effect on leukocyte scores.
 
Using multiple regression, there was no significant
 
effect of either self-esteem, defensiveness or their
 
interaction on leukocyte levels.
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DISCUSSION
 
Of all the physiological icieasures used in this
 
study, only diastolic blood pressure produced signifi
 
cant results involving self-esteem and that was in the
 
interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness. The
 
mimimal effect of the interaction on diastolic blood
 
pressure occurred when the control variables were
 
included individually or in combination. The effect of
 
the interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness
 
on diastolic blood pressure with the control variables
 
was not present in all combinations. When this inter
 
action effect occurred, it appeared in unexpected
 
places.
 
Examination of the interaction of self-esteem and
 
defensiveness using different regression methods sug
 
gest that its effect is mimimal, at best. As might be
 
expected, weight and age were the significant independ
 
ent predictors of diastolic blood pressure.
 
Since blood pressure was assessed only once at the
 
beginning of the study, this method may be flawed.
 
Seer (1979) pointed out that BP changes considerably,
 
both with time of day (Agras, et al., 1980) and in
 
response to various environmental and behavioral fac
 
tors (Harshfield, Pickering, Kleiner, Blank & Laragh,
 
1982). Thus, health-care professionals have been con­
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cerned about the representativeness of BP readings and
 
the adequacy of decisions based on those measures.
 
Since the subjects were attending the Yale Behav
 
ioral Medicine Clinic for stress-related disorders, it
 
seems reasonable to assurae that these subjects were
 
experiencing stress in their lives. Could it be that
 
these results were obtained because the subjects were
 
tested during an identity disruption crisis brought on
 
by their stress, mood state or coping style before they
 
had had an opportunity to readjust their self-esteem or
 
change their coping style? Hence, blood pressure or
 
other physiological measures may have been atypical at
 
the time. That may account for the lack of main ef
 
fects for self-esteem and defensiveness for the physio
 
logical health measures, and the reason age, weight and
 
smoking habits were more predictive since each of the
 
control variables may be more sensitive to changes in
 
stress than personality measures.
 
Regarding thyroxine, self-esteem was not signifi
 
cant in any condition. Defensiveness taken from the
 
MCSDS was the best predictive variable followed by sex,
 
but only when the interaction between self-esteem and
 
defensiveness was omitted. These results are difficult
 
to interpret because thyroxine levels are known to be
 
affected by mood and stress, and studies have indicated
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bi-directional results. If future research is planned,
 
the effects of sex may further differentiate the ef
 
fects of defensiveness and perhaps self-esteem on
 
thyroxine levels, as well as other physiological meas
 
ures.
 
Age and weight were significant predictors of both
 
systolic blood pressure and cholesterol levels, while
 
self-esteem or defensiveness were not. However, nei
 
ther self-esteem, defensiveness, their interaction or
 
the control variables were predictive measures of
 
leukocyte levels.
 
The source for the Self-Esteem Questionnaire in
 
this Study were items taken from the Taylor Manifest
 
Anxiety Scale, Beck Depression Scale and SCL-R-90 that
 
were assumed to measure self-esteem. In many cases,
 
the items addressed issues of negative self-esteem
 
(e.g. "I am certainly lacking in self-confidence") and
 
perhaps subsequent negative affect since only one of
 
the items was positively worded. The resulting data
 
may have been tainted by the subjects' mood state when
 
the self-report was taken, thereby confounding the
 
results.
 
Since negative self-esteem and affect have been
 
shown to affect physical health by mediating the ef
 
fects of stress, one would have expected significant
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relationships between the physical health measures and
 
self-esteem. However, the negative affect itself may
 
have biased the self-esteem measure.
 
The results of this research seem consistent with
 
studies by McCrae, et al. (1976) and Tessler and Me
 
chanic (1978) who found an intriguing pattern. Nega
 
tive affect correlated significantly with self-rated
 
physical health, self-rated physical health was signif
 
icantly related to physicians rating, but negative
 
affect was not related to objectivly obtained measures,
 
such as blood pressure scores and cholesterol levels.
 
Watson and Pennebacker (1989) noted a linear and con
 
tinuous relationship between NA scores and somatic
 
complaining. At any level of NA, the higher the NA
 
score, the more increasing the symptoms (Costa &
 
McCrae, 1985). Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found that
 
despite their iiyriad of physical complaint, high NA
 
individuals showed no increased frequency of physician
 
or health-center visits.
 
Watson and Pennebaker (1989) offered the following
 
explanations for their results; High NA individuals
 
are more sensitive to pain and/or are hypervigilant and
 
scan their environment for impending trouble. In
 
assessing sensitivity to pain, these authors found the
 
literature inconsistent and difficult to intepret.
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Although negative affect has been found related to an
 
individual's report of pain, other investigators have
 
reported that negative affect is generally unrelated to
 
pain threshold and tolerance measures. Because the
 
literative in this area is inconsistent, interpretation
 
of these results based on the subjects' negative affect
 
filtered through self-reports would be foolhardy since
 
additional factors must be involved as well.
 
Watson and Pennebaker (1989) felt that hypervigi­
lance increased somatic complaining in two ways:
 
First, high NA's may be more likely to notice or attend
 
to normal body sensation or minor aches and pains.
 
Second, because their scanning is highly related with
 
anxiety and uncertainty, high NA individuals may inter
 
pret normal symptoms as painful or pathological.
 
Indeed, Watson and Pennebaker note several studies have
 
shown that high NA subject interpret ambiguous stimuli
 
in a negative or threatening manner (Goodstein, 1954;
 
Watson & Clark, 1984) suggesting that high NA subjects
 
report more physical problems simply because they are
 
more internally focused. Pennebaker and Lightner
 
(1980) support the idea that internal orientation
 
increases physical symptom reporting.
 
In their 1989 study, Watson and Pennebaker con
 
cluded that although NA is associated with a number of
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subjective complaints and is highly correlated with
 
physical symptom measures, NA is more a general trait
 
of somatopsychic distress which is self-reported dis
 
tress that is expressed through a broad range of nega
 
tive affective states and somatic complaints. As such,
 
NA acts as a nuisance factor in health research because
 
it may tap as psychologically important, but organical
 
ly it remains a spurious variance in physical symptom
 
measures. Because self-reported measures of stress and
 
health both contain a significant NA component, the
 
relationship between such measures is likely to be
 
overstated or hide the true associations between stress
 
and health and self-esteem and health.
 
If this research were to be replicated, another
 
selection of subjects must be considered, such as
 
university students. The subjects of this study were
 
not randomly selected, but rather self-selected as they
 
were patients at a clinic treating stress-related
 
disorders. Further, the psychological test battery
 
should include at least one self-esteem measure, (i.e.,
 
Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965),
 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Roid & Fitts, 1988), or
 
Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967),
 
a trait measure for negative affect (i.e., Eysenck
 
Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale (Eysenck &
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Eysenck, 1968), Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
 
1951) or Tellegen's Multidimensional Personality Ques
 
tionnaire (Tellegen, 1982), and a positive affect trait
 
measure (i.e.. Positive Emotionality Scale from Telle
 
gen's Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire).^
 
Since all currently accepted self-esteem measures are
 
self-reported, the MCSDS (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964)
 
should be used as a control for defensiveness. The
 
physical health measures would remain the same. Evalu
 
ation of the results should not only be examined glo
 
bally, but also for sex differences.
 
This study reflects the difficulty of collecting
 
arousal data for comparison with social or personality
 
variables. The use of self-reported measures is a
 
widely accepted form of research due to its inexpensive
 
cost and ease of administration. The results, however,
 
are filtered through the subject's moods states and
 
self-perceptions. Since both types of data (self­
reports and some physiological data, i.e., cholesterol
 
and leukocyte tests) cannot be collected simultaneous
 
ly, changes in mood and arousal can easily occur even
 
when the two types of data are collected concurrently.
 
Aversive emotional states such as negative affect
 
are affective responses to self-devaluing experiences
 
and subjective distress (Kaplan, 1975; Watson & Clark,
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1984) and low self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). Although
 
negative affect is considered a diffuse, nonspecific
 
measure of subjective distress and dissatisfaction, it
 
is considered a common measure of low self-esteem
 
(Watson & Clark, 1984).
 
This data supports Watson and Pennebaker (1989)
 
that negative affect and thereby, low self-esteem, is
 
more a general trait of somatopsychic distress ex
 
pressed over a broad range of affective states. Somat
 
ic complaints act as a nuisance in health research,
 
clouding the true associations between self-esteem and
 
physical health.
 
It may be that, in fact, self-esteem is related
 
only to self-evaluated assessments of health, and not
 
to actual health. On the other hand, if self-esteem
 
had been measured independently in positive as well as
 
negative terms, it would have provided a better test of
 
the relationship between self-esteem and physical
 
health than what was available. The relationship
 
between self-esteem and physical health requires more
 
valid measures of self-esteem, as well as more research
 
using other than subjective measures of health.
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APPENDIX A.
 
SELF-ESTEEM QUESTIONNAIRE - PILOT STUDY
 
USE A #2 PENCIL ONLY FOR YOUR ANSWERS. ANY
 
OTHER PENCIL FOR INK MARK WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.
 
USE ONLY THE SCAN SHEET FOR YOUR ANSWERS.
 
MARKS ON THE PRINTED QUESTIONNAIRE WILL NOT BE USED.
 
RETURN BOTH THE SCAN SHEET AND QUESTIONNAIRE. THANK
 
YOU.
 
PART A: On this part of the questionnaire are groups
 
of stateinents. Please read the entire group of state
 
ments of each category^ Then pick out the ONE state
 
ment in that group which best describes the way you
 
feel today, that is, RIGHT NOWl. MARK YOUR ANSWER A^
 
Ix. C or D^THE SCAN SHEET ATTACHED TO THE TEST. If
 
several statements in the group seem to apply equally
 
well, mark each one.
 
Be sure to read all the statements in each group
 
before making your choice.
 
1. 	 (Beck-Sadness)*
 
a. 	I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
 
b. 	I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap
 
out of it.
 
c. 	I feel sad or blue.
 
d. 	I do not feel sad.
 
2. 	 (Beck-Pessimism)
 
a. 	I feel that the future is hopeless and that
 
things cannot improve.
 
b. 	I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
 
c. 	I feel discouraged about the future.
 
d. 	I am not particularly pessimistic or
 
discouraged about the future.
 
3. 	 (Beck-Sense of Failure)
 
a. 	I feel I am a complete failure as a person
 
(parent, husband, wife).
 
b. 	As I look back on ny life, all I can see is
 
a lot of failures.
 
c. 	I feel I have failed more than the average
 
person.
 
d. 	I do not feel like a failure.
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4. 	 (Beck-Dissatisfaction)
 
a. 	I am dissatisfied with evearything.
 
b. 	I don't get satisfaction out of anything
 
anymore.
 
c. 	I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
 
d. 	I am not particularly dissatisfied.
 
5. 	 (Beck-Self-Dislike)
 
a. 	I hate myself.
 
b. 	I am disgusted with myself.
 
c. 	I am disappointed with myself.
 
d. 	I don't feel disappointed with myself.
 
6. 	 (Beck-Self-Harm)
 
a. 	I would kill myself if I had the chance.
 
b. 	I have definite plans about committing
 
suicide.
 
c. 	I feel I would be better off dead.
 
d. 	I don't have any thoughts of harming nyself.
 
7. 	 (Beck-Social Withdrawal)
 
a. 	I have lot all of my interest in other people
 
and don't care about them at all.
 
b. 	I have lost more of my interest in other
 
people and have little feeling for them.
 
c. 	I am less interested in other people than I
 
used to be.
 
d. 	I have not lost interest in other people.
 
8. 	 (Beck-Indecisiveness)
 
a. 	I can't make any decisions at all anymore.
 
b. 	I have great difficulty in making decisions.
 
c. 	I try to put off making decisions.
 
d. 	I make decisions about as well as ever.
 
9. 	 (Beck-Self-Image Change)
 
a. 	I feel that I am ugly or repulsive-looking.
 
b. 	I feel that there are permanent changes in
 
my appearance and they make me look
 
unattractive.
 
c. 	I am worried that I am looking old or
 
unattractive.
 
d. 	I don't feel that I look any worse that I
 
used to.
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PART B; ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS EITHER TRUE
 
OR FALSE. BE SURE YOU MARK YOUR SCAN SHEET IN THE
 
APPROPRIATE CIRCLE - (T) TRUE OR (F) FALSE.
 
10. 	At times I think I am not good at all.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
11. 	I am more sensitive than most other people.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
12. 	I cannot keep my mind on one thing. (Taylor)
 
13. 	All in all I am included to£eei that I am a
 
failure. (Rosenberg)
 
14. 	I cannot keep my mind on one thing. (Taylor)
 
15. 	I certainly feel useless at times. (Rosenberg)
 
16. 	I have periods of such great restlessness that I
 
cannot set long in a chair. (Taylor)
 
17. 	I feel that I am a person of worth at least on
 
an equal basis with others. (Rosenberg)
 
18. 	I am inclined to take things hard. (Taylor)
 
19. 	I take a positive attitude toward myself.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
20. 	Life is a strain for me much of the time. (Taylor)
 
21. 	I certainly feel useless much of the time.
 
(Taylor)
 
22. 	I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
 
(Taylor)
 
23. 	I feel that I have a nuirber of good qualities.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
24. 	I have sometimes felt that difficulties were
 
piling up so high that I could not overcome them.
 
(Taylor)
 
25. 	I feel anxiety about something or someone almost
 
all the time. (Taylor)
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26. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
27. 	I frequently find nyself worrying about something.
 
(Taylor)
 
28. 	I am able to do things as well as most other
 
people. (Rosenberg)
 
29. 	I shrink from facing a crisis of difficulty.
 
(Taylor)
 
30. 	I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
 
(Taylor)
 
31. 	I wish I could have more respect for myself.
 
(Rosenberg)
 
32. 	I am happy most of the time. (Taylor)
 
33. 	At times I think I am no good at all. (Taylor)
 
34. 	I believe I am no more nervous than most others.
 
(Taylor)
 
PART C; Below is a list of problems and complaints
 
that people have. Read each one carefully, and select
 
one of the nuirbered descriptors that best describes HOW
 
MUCH DISCOMFORT THAT PROBLEM HAS CAUSED YOU DURING THE
 
PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY. MARK YOUR ANSWER A. B, C. D
 
OR E^THE SCAN SHEET. BE CAREFUL THAT YOU ARE
 
MARKING YOUR ANSWER ON THE CORRECT LINE. Do not skip
 
any items, and mark your answer clearly. If you change
 
your mind, erase your first answer completely. Read
 
the example below before beginning.
 
EXAMPLE
 
Descriptors;
 
HOW MUCH ARE YOU DISTRESS BY; A Not at all
 
B A little bit
 
Answer C Moderately
 
D Quite a bit
 
Ex. Body aches Ex. C E Extremely
 
35. 	Feeling that others do not understand you or
 
are unsympathetic. (SCL-R-90)
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36. 	Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you.
 
(SCL-R-90)
 
37; 	Feeling inferior to others. (SCL-R-90)
 
38. 	Feeling uneasy when people are watching or talking
 
about you. (SCL-R-90)
 
39. 	Feeling very self-conscious with others.
 
(SCL-R-9Q)
 
40. 	Feeling uncomfortable about eating or drinking
 
in public. (SCL-R-90)
 
41. 	Repeated unpleasant thoughts that won't leave
 
your mind. (SCL-R-90)
 
42. 	Difficulty making decisions. (SCL-R-90)
 
43. 	Thoughts ending your life. (SCL-R-90)
 
/
 
44. 	Crying easily. (SCL-R-90)
 
45. 	Feeling of being trapped or caught. (SCL-R-90)
 
46. 	Blaming yourself for things. (SCL-R-90)
 
47. 	Feeling hopeless about the future. (SCL-R-90)
 
48. 	Feeling of worthlessness. (SCL-R-90)
 
IF YOU HAVE AMY COMMENTS REGARDING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE,
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO LIST THEM BELOW:
 
Note: Parentheses denote the test source the item was
 
taken from, i.e.. Beck (Beck Depression Inventory),
 
Taylor (Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale), or Rosenberg
 
(Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale). However, the notation
 
did not appear on the actual test.
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APPENDIX B*
 
MARLOWE-CROWN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE
 
Please read each statement and decide whether you
 
feel in general that it is mostly true as applied to
 
you or mostly false. Please circle the appropriate
 
letter (T^true, F-False) directly to the right of each
 
statement. Answer "True" to positively stated ques
 
tions if they are true as often or more often than
 
stated. For example, answer "True" to "Occasionally, I
 
play poker" if you play occasionally or more often.
 
1. 	 I am sometimes irritated by people who
 
ask favors of me. 1. T F
 
2. 	 Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the
 
qualifications of all the candidates. 2. T F
 
3. 	 I sometime think when people have a misfortune
 
they only got what they deserved. 3. T F
 
4. 	 I like to gossip at times. 4. T F
 
5. 	 On occasion I have had doubts about my
 
ability to succeed in life. 5. T F
 
6. 	 There have been occasions when I took
 
advantage of someone. 6. T F
 
7. 	 I have never intensely disliked
 
anyone. 7. T F
 
8. 	 I never make a long trip without checking
 
the safety of my car. 8. T F
 
9. 	 I am always courteous, even with people
 
who are disagreeable. 9. T F
 
10. 	On a few occasions, I have given up doing
 
something because I thought too little of
 
my ability. 10. T F
 
11. 	I am always careful about my manner
 
of dress. 11. T F
 
12. I have never felt that I was punished
 
without a cause. 12. T F
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13. 	When I don't know sortiething, I don't mind
 
admitting it. 13. T F
 
14. 	I never resent being asked to return a
 
favor. 14. T F
 
15. 	I sometimes try to get even, rather than
 
forgive and forget. 15. T F
 
16. 	If I could get into a movie without paying
 
and be sure I was not seen, I would probably
 
do it. 16. T F
 
17. 	I have never deliberately said something
 
that hurt someone's feelings. 17. T F
 
18. 	I can remember "playing sick" to get out
 
of something. 18. T F
 
19. 	I sometimes feel resentful when I don't
 
get iry way. , 19. T F
 
20. 	No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always
 
a good listener. 20. T F
 
21. 	I always try to practice what I
 
preach. 21. T F
 
22. 	There have been times when I was quite jealous
 
of the good fortune of others. 22. T F
 
23. 	I have never been irked when people express
 
ideas very different from my own. 23. T F
 
24. 	My table manners at home are as good as
 
when I eat out in a restaurant. 24. T F
 
25. 	There have been occasions when I felt like
 
smashing things. 25. T F
 
26. 	I never hesitate to go out of my way to
 
help someone in trouble. 26. T F
 
27. 	It is sometimes hard for me to go on with
 
my work if I,am not encouraged. 27. T F
 
28. 	I'm always willing to admit it when I make
 
a mistake. 28. T F
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29. 	There have been times when I felt like rebelling
 
against people in authority even though I knew
 
they were right. 29. T F
 
30. 	I have almost never felt the urge to tell
 
someone off. 30. T F
 
31. 	I would never think of letting someone else
 
be punished for rry wrong-doings. 31. T F
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